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FOURTH AMENDMENT-THE
EXPANSION OF THE TERRY
DOCTRINE TO COMPLETED
FELONIES
United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Hensley,' the United States Supreme Court
held that when law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspi-
cion, based on specific and articulable facts, that a suspect is wanted
in connection with a completed felony, the officers may stop and
investigate that person.2 The Court in Hensley derived its holding
from the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio,3 which held that the police
may stop a person and briefly detain him if the officers have a rea-
sonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity.
4
The Hensley Court thus expanded the Terry decision to encompass
the investigation of any person who is suspected of being involved
in completed criminal activity.
The Court in Hensley also held that if a flyer has been issued on
the basis of articulable facts, grounded in a reasonable suspicion
that the person sought has committed a criminal offense, then of-
ficers in a neighboring department may rely on the flyer.5 This reli-
ance justifies the officers' stop of the person to check identification
and ask him questions, and the officer may briefly detain the person
while attempting to elicit additional information.6
This Note will examine the reasoning that underlies the Court's
willingness to extend the Terry decision to include the investigation
of completed felonies and to foster interdepartmental reliance. In
addition, this Note will argue that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hensley is justified in light of the compelling governmental interests
of bringing at large offenders to justice.
1 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
2 Id. at 681.
3 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4 Id. at 30.





The fourth amendment guarantees an individual the right to be
secure in his home and property against unreasonable searches and
seizures, 7 and provides that no warrants shall be issued against an
individual, unless grounded in probable cause.8 In Terry v. Ohio, the
Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the fourth amend-
ment's probable cause standard.9 The Court held that a law en-
forcement officer may stop, search, and detain briefly for
questioning an individual whom the officer has a reasonable suspi-
cion to believe is connected with criminal activity.' 0 The Court
noted, however, that the officer must be able to justify his intrusion
by citing to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion.""1 The Court noted that while there is no hard and fast rule
for determining the reasonableness of a search and seizure, a bal-
ancing test must be employed to weigh the need to perform the
search aganst the individual's right to be free from intrusion. 12
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment states that:
[tihe rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Teny, 392 U.S. at 27.
10 Id. at 30. The issue in Teny was whether guns seized during an officer's brief on-
the-spot "stop and frisk" of three men suspected by the officer of contemplating a rob-
bery should be admitted into evidence at trial. Id. at 12. The prosecution argued that
the guns should be admitted into evidence because the arresting officer had probable
cause to arrest the suspects prior to his pat-down search, thereby making the guns'
seizure incidental to a lawful arrest. Although the trial court rejected this notion, it
denied the defendants' motion to suppress the guns from evidence, reasoning that the
officer's law enforcement experience gave him "reasonable cause" to believe that the
defendants' conduct was suspicious and required further investigation. The trial court
held that since the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the men may have been
contemplating a felony and may have been armed, his pat-down search was "essential to
the proper performance of the officer's investigatory duties," and helped to insure his
own protection. Id. at 7-8. Therefore, the court ruled that the discovery of a loaded gun
during a "stop and frisk" was admissible into evidence. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 21. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that it would be unreasonable to
preclude an offcer from taking necessary measures to ascertain whether, in fact, an indi-
vidual is armed, if the officer is justified in believing that the individual is armed and
poses a potential threat to the officer's safety. Id. at 24.
12 Id. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Citing to Teny, the Court in
Dunaway noted that the Tery exception balances "the limited violation of individual pri-
vacy involved against the opposing interest in crime prevention and detection and the
police officer's safety." Id. at 209.
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In Adams v. Williams,13 the Supreme Court relied on Terry to
hold that an officer could forcibly stop and investigate a suspect
from an informant's tip that the suspect was carrying narcotics and
weapons. 14 The Court in Adams held that "[a] brief stop of a suspi-
cious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may
be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
time."15
Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,16 the Supreme Court
held that in light of the enforcement problems unique to Border
Patrol agents, these agents may stop vehicles traveling the border
route if the officers have specific, articulable facts that the vehicles
are transporting illegal aliens.17 In the factually similar case of
United States v. Cortez, 18 the Court attempted to define the circum-
stances that evoke a reasonable suspicion on the part of an investi-
gating officer making a Terry-like stop.' 9
The Court in Cortez noted that the common theme enunciated
by various courts that have interpreted the Terry "reasonableness"
standard is the idea that the officer must derive his reasonable suspi-
cion from the "totality of the circumstances. ' 20 Implicit in this deri-
vation process are two elements, each of which must be present
before a stop is permissible. 21 First, the officer must make an assess-
ment based on all the circumstances leading to the stop, including
his objective observations, information from police reports, and a
consideration of the behavior patterns associated with certain cate-
gories of criminals.22 Second, the product of the officer's analysis
must raise a suspicion that the individual being stopped is engaged
in wrong-doing. 23 The Court used this two-step reasonableness
analysis to hold that the information acquired by two border patrol
13 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
14 Adams, 407 U.S. at 149. The Supreme Court noted that the informant was known
to the officer and had supplied him with information in the past. Id. at 146.
15 Id. at 146. The Adams Court cited Terry for the proposition that this type of proce-
dure is "the essence of good police work." Id. at 145.
16 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
17 Id. at 881. The Court ultimately ruled, however, that in this particular case, the
Terry exception did not justify roving border patrol agents' random stops of vehicles
when the agents suspected the vehicles' occupants of being illegal aliens merely because
they were of Mexican ancestry. Id. at 886-887.
18 449 U.S. 411 (1981). See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
19 Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18.
20 Id. at 417.





agents was sufficient to justify the agents' stop of a vehicle suspected
of carrying illegal aliens.
24
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the Tery rationale
in Michigan v. Summers. 25 In Summers, the Court held that
[t]hese cases [Teny and its progeny] recognize that some seizures ad-
mittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited
intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified
by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made
on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis
for suspecting criminal activity.
26
III. FACTS
Officer Kenneth Davis of the St. Bernard Police Department in
Ohio interviewed an informant regarding the armed robbery of a St.
Bernard tavern.27 The informant stated that Thomas Hensley drove
the getaway car during the robbery.28 Although Officer Davis did
not believe that he could establish probable cause to arrest Hensley
on the basis of the informant's information, the St. Bernard Police
Department issued a flyer stating that if seen, Hensley should be
stopped "for investigation only" regarding the robbery.29 The flyer
was issued for circulation to neighboring communities, including
Covington, Kentucky.30 Having been alerted by the flyer, Coving-
ton policeman Daniel Cope stopped Hensley while he was driving
within Covington's city limits. 3 ' Because the officer knew that Hens-
ley was wanted in connection with the robbery, Officer Cope drew
his service revolver and ordered Hensley and his passenger, Albert
Green, to step out of the automobile and place their hands on the
trunk of their car until back-up units arrived.3 2
When the back-up unit arrived, Officer David Rassache looked
at the opened passenger door of Hensley's car and noticed the butt
24 Id. at 421.
25 452 U.S. 692 (1981). In this case, the Court permitted the detention of the occu-
pant of a house while the police, pursuant to a warrant, searched the house, even though
they lacked probable cause to arrest the occupant prior to the search. Id. at 705.
26 Id. at 699.
27 United States v. Hensley, 713 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1983) The informant, Janie
Hansford, had been told by her boyfriend's brother that he (the brother) and another
man had robbed the tavern and that Hensley had driven the getaway car. Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 222.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Officer Cope testified at trial that he feared for his safety while making the
stop. He also stated that he intended to detain Hensley only long enough to ascertain
whether there was a warrant outstanding for Hensley's arrest. In the absence of a war-
rant, Cope testified that he intended to release Hensley. Id.
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of a gun protruding from under the passenger seat.33 A search of
Hensley's car by the officers revealed two more firearms, and both
Hensley and Green were placed under arrest.
34
At trial, Hensley argued that the guns were inadmissible evi-
dence because they were obtained during an illegal search.3 5 He
also argued that the St. Bernard police, by their own admission, be-
lieved that they lacked probable cause to arrest based on the inform-
ant's statement, 36 and therefore, that the Covington officers' arrest
violated the flyer's directive to detain Hensley "for investigation
only." 37 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, however, ruled that the informant's statement constituted
probable cause for Hensley's arrest.38 The court, therefore, admit-
ted the guns into evidence and convicted Hensley for violating a
federal statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.3 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding that Hensley had been arrested legally.4 0 The court
of appeals held that the Covington officers were not justified in mak-
ing a Terry stop of Hensley because the Supreme Court had limited
the Terry exception to the investigation of "ongoing crimes." 4' The
Sixth Circuit distinguished Hensley from Terry and its progeny, not-
ing that at the time of Hensley's arrest there was an absence of exi-
gent circumstances justifying Hensley's detention by the Covington
police.42 The court of appeals also held that the St. Bernard flyer
lacked sufficient information to create a reasonable suspicion in the
minds of the Covington officers to warrant their Terry stop of Hens-
ley.43 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, concluded that the illegality of
33 Id.
34 Id. Immediately after finding the gun, the officers searched for other weapons in a
jacket lying between the two front seats and an open gym bag on the back seat. The
officers found a handgun wrapped in the jacket and another in the gym bag. All three
guns were loaded. The gym bag also contained hypodermic needles, ski masks, a
change of clothing and a controlled substance. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, United States
v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
35 Hensley, 713 F.2d at 221.
36 Id. at 223.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 222.
39 Id. at 221.
40 Id. at 225.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 224. The court also refused to apply the "collective knowledge" doctrine,
holding that even if the St. Bernard Police Department had probable cause, this fact
would not have imbued the Covington officers with probable cause because the two
departments were not directly working together in the investigation. Id. at 223.
43 Id. at 225. The court's holding on this point reads as follows: "we hold that the
990 [Vol. 76
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
the Covington officers' arrest precluded the admissibility of the
guns seized during the stop.4 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether officers may stop and briefly detain a per-
son, for whom a wanted flyer has been issued, to check whether
there is also a warrant outstanding for the person's arrest.45
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In United States v. Hensley, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
decision 46 reversed the court of appeals' holding that the Terry ex-
ception is confined to the investigation of imminent or ongoing
crimes.47 The Court in Hensley held that the Terry exception is
equally applicable to both the investigation of completed felonies
and the investigation of future or ongoing crimes.48 The Hens/ey
court based its conclusion on the opinions given in several earlier
cases, including United States v. Cortez49 and United States v. Place.50 In
Cortez, the Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that an officer may stop
and investigate a suspect if there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the suspect was involved in past criminal activity.5 1 Similiarly,
in United States v. Place, the Supreme Court stated that an officer may
stop and question a person if the officer has a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person was engaged in criminal activity. 52
The Supreme Court in Hensey determined that the Sixth Cir-
cuit's reliance on Florida v. Royer 53 was erroneous for two reasons.5 4
First, the Sixth Circuit cited Royer to support its belief that the
Supreme Court intended the Terry exception to be applicable only
to ongoing crimes.5 5 The Hensley Court, however, distinguished
Fourth Amendment does not permit police officers in one department to seize a person
simply because a neighboring police department has circulated a flyer reflecting the de-
sire to question that individual about some criminal investigation that does not involve
the arresting officers of their department." Id.
44 Id.
45 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 677-78.
46 105 S. Ct. at 685. Justce Brennan filed a brief concurrence indicating his approval
of the Court's application of the Terry exception to this case. Id.
47 Id. at 680.
48 Id. at 681.
49 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
50 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
51 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680 (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 n.2 (1981)).
52 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 702). The Place Court found
that the length of detention of a traveler suspected by Drug Enforcement Administration
agents of transporting narcotics violated the suspect's fourth amendment rights, thereby
rendering inadmissible cocaine discovered in his luggage. Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
5A 460 U.S. 491 (1983).




Royer stating that in Royer it held that, although the crime being in-
vestigated was ongoing, the intrusive nature of the search removed
it from the ambit of the Teny exception. 56 Second, the Supreme
Court in Hensley declared that Royer was consistent with prior case
law that recognized the applicability of the Terry exception to com-
pleted crimes. 57 The Hensley Court cited Royer for the explict prop-
osition that "Terry created a limited exception to this general rule:
certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there
is articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to
commit a crime."
58
The Court in Hensley set forth a balancing test to determine the
extent of limitations to be placed on police investigations of com-
pleted felonies. 59 That test, based on the fourth amendment's rea-
sonableness standard, weighs the quality and nature of the intrusion
of an individual's right to privacy against the government's interest
in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.60 The Court
held that when a reasonableness analysis is applied to the investiga-
tions of completed crimes, probable cause need not always be pres-
ent to justify an investigation. 61 Accordingly, the Court held that
where the police have a "reasonable suspicion grounded in specific
and articulable facts" 62 that a person they encounter was involved in
or is wanted in connection with a completed felony,63 the strong
56 Id. (citing to Royer, 460 U.S. at 501). The Royer Court determined that:
the bounds of an investigative stop had been exceeded. In its (the Florida District
Court of Appeals) view the 'confinement' in this case went beyond the limited re-
straint of a Terry investigative stop, and Royer's consent was thus tainted by the
illegality, a conclusion that required reversal in the absence of probable cause to
arrest. The question before us is whether the record warrants that conclusion. We
think that it does.
Royer, 460 U.S. at 501.
57 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680.
58 Id. (quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added)).
59 See Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680.
60 See id.
61 Id. The Court stated that the factors in the balance may be different when a stop is
made to investigate a completed crime rather than an imminent or ongoing one. In the
latter categories, the governmental interests of crime prevention, public safety, and the
necessity of action in the midst of exigent circumstances figure prominently in the bal-
ance. On the other hand, when an investigaton is made of a completed crime, the Court
stated that the dominant governmental interests are solving crimes and bringing offend-
ers to justice. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that these latter interests are compelling
enough to justify brief stops and questioning of individuals suspected by policemen of
completed criminal activity. The Court concluded that these interests outweigh the in-
trusion on the individual's freedom. Id. at 680-81.
62 Id. at 681.
63 Id. The Court declined to extend its holding to include all completed crimes.
Rather, it restricted its application only to the most serious crime classification felonies.
The Court stated that, "[p]articularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a
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governmental interests in apprehending the offender and solving
the crime allows the police to make a brief stop of the person for
questioning and to check his identification. 64
The Hensley Court then considered the validity of the investiga-
tive stop conducted by the Covington officers in reliance on the flyer
issued by the St. Bernard Police Department.65 The Court analo-
gized Hensley to the factually similar case of Whiteley v. Warden,66 in
which a Wyoming sheriff obtained an arrest warrant for Whiteley, a
suspected burglar, and issued a report over the state's police radio
network describing Whiteley, his car, and the stolen property.67
The report, however, did not specify the evidence underlying the
issuing officer's belief that he had sufficient probable cause to arrest
Whiteley.68 Acting in reliance on the report, police officers in an-
other department stopped Whiteley's car, arrested him, and then
searched the car.69
The Supreme Court in Whiteley concluded that because the
sheriff lacked probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, the evi-
dence discovered during the officer's search was inadmissible.70
The Whiteley Court noted, however, that if the sheriff had probable
cause to obtain an arrest warrant, the interdepartmental arrest
would have been valid, despite the arresting officer's ignorance of
the specific facts supporting the determination of probable cause.71
Thus, the Whiteley Court held that when evidence is discovered dur-
ing a search incidental to an arrest by officers from a separate de-
partment, the evidence is admissible if the department issuing the
report had probable cause to make an arrest.72 In accordance with
threat to public safety, it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect
detained as promptly as possible." Id.
64 Id. Applying the reasoning to the facts of Hensley, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the informant's statement to Officer Davis was sufficient to arouse a reasonable
suspicion in Davis that Hensley was involved in an armed robbery. Id. at 683-84. Fur-
ther, the Court stated that since Hensley was at large from the instant Davis' suspicion
arose until he was finally stopped by the Covington police, Hensley's stop and detention
at the earliest possible moment was not inconsistent with the principles of the fourth
amendment. Id. The Court, however, did not state what these principles were.
65 Id.
66 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
67 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681; (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 563). The stolen property
was money, including an assortment of old coins. Whitely, 401 U.S. at 564.
68 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681 (citing Whitdey, 401 U.S. at 565).
69 Id. (citing Whitelky, 401 U.S. at 563). The arresting officer removed a number of
items from Whiteley's car, including tools and old coins. One of the establishments
which Whiteley was suspected of robbing was a hardware store. Whiteey, 401 U.S. at 562.
70 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681-82 (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568).
71 Id. at 682 (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568).
72 Id. (citing Whiteley, 401 U.S. at 568).
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the Whiteley Court's implicit approval of interdepartmental reliance
on warrants issued by other police departments, the Hensley Court
stated that in an era when criminals have ready mobility, the notion
of interdepartmental reliance is nothing more than the exercise of
"common sense" by law enforcement officials. 73
The Court in Hensley, while noting its previous approval of in-
terdepartmental reliance in Whiteley, distinguished Whiteley from
Hensley on the basis of the report relayed by the issuing police de-
partment.74 Whereas the report in Whiteley mentioned an arrest
warrant, the flyer circulated by the St. Bernard Police Department in
Hensley stated that Hensley was only wanted for investigation of a
robbery.75 The Hensley Court determined the relevance of this dis-
tinction by referring to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in United States v. Robinson.76
In Robinson, the Ninth Circuit applied Whiteley and concluded
that if an officer who issues a bulletin has a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, an officer from another de-
partment may act in reliance on that bulletin.77 The latter officer
need not have personal knowledge of the information or evidence
that underlies the issuing officer's reasonable suspicion.78 The
Robinson court determined that in such circumstances, interdepart-
mental reliance serves to promote effective law enforcement. 79 The
Hensley Court held that the Ninth Circuit's interdepartmental reli-
ance theory served to promote the same governmental interest that
weighed in favor of permitting Terry stops to investigate completed
felonies. 80  The Supreme Court in Hensley stated that the
countervailng interest of security from personal intrusion was mini-
mal by comparison.8'
Accordingly, Justice O'Connor in Hensley concluded that the
balancing test that operates to permit officers to make a Terry stop of
a person suspected of committing completed crimes should permit




76 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
77 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681 (citing Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1300).
78 Id. (citing Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299-1300).
79 Id. (citing Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299). The Ninth Circuit stated that, "effective law
enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and infor-
mation transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act
swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation
for the transmitted information." Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299.




department to make investigatory stops regarding completed felo-
nies.8 2 The Supreme Court, therefore, held that evidence obtained
during an investigatory stop is admissible if the officer issuing the
bulletin or flyer harbored a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop,
provided that the stop was not significantly more intrusive than the




The Supreme Court's decision in Hensley extends the Teny ex-
ception8 4 to include completed criminal activity. The Hensley deci-
sion also enunciates the Court's approval of interdepartmental
police cooperation to bring at-large offenders to justice. These ex-
tensions of crime-solving procedures currently available to law en-
forcement officials represent a willingness by the Supreme Court to
further the governmental interest of solving past crimes and appre-
hending felons while safeguarding the rights of citizens as guaran-
teed by the fourth amendment.
A. THE EXTENSION OF THE TERRY EXCEPTION INTO THE AREA OF
COMPLETED CRIMES.
The first issue the Hensley Court addressed was the scope of the
fourth amendment probable cause exception formulated by the
Court in Terry v. Ohio.8 5 The Terry exception states that, consistent
82 Id.
83 Id. at 683. Applying the principle of interdepartmental reliance to the facts of
Hensley, the Court reasoned that an objective reading of the St. Bernard flyer contained
facts sufficient to indicate to an experienced officer that, if seen, Hensley should be
stopped, positively identified, questioned, and informed that he was wanted for ques-
tioning by the St. Bernard police. Thus, based on the articulable facts that supported
the reasonable suspicion, the Court concluded that a brief stop to ascertain and relate
the aforementioned information was not unreasonable. Further, the Court noted that
once Hensley was stopped, it was reasonable to assume that an experienced officer
would be inclined to check whether a warrant had been issued for Hensley's arrest. The
Court, therefore, held that in light of the reasonable suspicion of the issuing depart-
ment, coupled with an objective reading of the flyer, the length and level of intrusive-
ness of this stop was justified and did not violate Hensley's fourth amendment rights.
The Covington police were entitled to seize evidence obtained during the lawful stop
and such evidence was admissible at trial. The Court also stated that once the guns were
discovered, the Covington police then had probable cause to arrest Hensley for firearms
possession. Although the Court stated that the length of Hensley's detainment was ir-
relevant once the weapons were discovered, the Court cautioned that the Covington
police may have overstepped their fourth amendment authority had they detained Hens-
ley solely on the basis of the flyer until the.St. Bernard police could question him. Id. at
684.
84 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
85 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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with the fourth amendment, policemen may stop and investigate
suspects absent a showing of probable cause only when the police-
men have a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.86 The
Court in Hensley held that the exception was applicable to an investi-
gatory stop of a person suspected of having committed a completed
felony.87 The Court undertook a review of cases that dealt with the
applicability of the Terry exception and correctly concluded that
there existed no proscription against extending the Terry exception
to law enforcement officials investigating individuals reasonably be-
lieved to have perpetrated a completed felony.88
Although Terry involved a policeman's stop and investigation of
men whom the officer personally believed were contemplating an
imminent robbery,8 9 its exception is not confined to that particular
situation. For example, in Adams v. Williams,90 the Supreme Court
held that the Terry rule is applicable to an investigation conducted
by a police officer based on an informant's report, rather than on
the actual citing of the criminal incident.9192 In Adams, the inform-
ant told the police officer that Adams was seated with a gun at his
waist in a nearby vehicle and possessed narcotics. 93 Acting on this
information, the officer approached Adams' car and asked him to
get out of the vehicle.94 When Adams responded by rolling down
the car window, the officer seized the gun and conducted a search of
the car, which uncovered the narcotics. 95 The Adams Court held that
in light of the facts available to the officer at the time of the encoun-
ter, the search and seizure was both reasonable and lawful.96
The Supreme Court concluded that the weapon and narcotics
seized by the officer were the fruits of a lawful search and were ad-
86 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The Terry Court stated that in determining whether an
officer acted reasonably, the standard to be applied was not whether the officer relied on
intuition but rather whether the officer relief on "the specific reasonable inferences
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id. The facts
referred to in the exception appear to be the officer's observations, including unusual
conduct by the suspect and any other observations that lead the officer, in light of his
experience, to believe that criminal activity may be imminent. Id. at 30.
87 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681.
88 Id. at 679-83. See supra notes 10-26 and accompanying text.
89 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
90 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
91 Id. at 149.
92 Id. at 145.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 145.




missible at trial.97 As a result, Adams extended the Teny exception in
two ways. First, it illustrated the Court's willingness to permit po-
licemen to act on reliable information supplied by others. 98 Second,
and more pertinent to the Hensley decision, the Adams Court implic-
itly expanded the Terry exception to include investigations of ongo-
ing crimes. 99
Having previously applied the Terry exception to investigations
of imminent and ongoing crimes, the task before the Supreme
Court in Hensley was to determine whether the exception was equally
applicable to the investgation of a completed crime. The Supreme
Court disagreed, and rightfully so, with the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Hensley holding that the Terry exception was inapplicable to the
investigation of completed crimes. 100 Although the Sixth Circuit at-
tempted to restrict the Supreme Court's application of the Terry ex-
ception to the realm of ongoing offenses by citing Florida v. Royer,101
the Sixth Circuit's reliance on Royer was misplaced. The Supreme
Court in Royer specifically held that an investigative detention is
outside the scope of the Terry exception only when it escalates into a
prolonged and severely intrusive detention search.10 2 Furthermore,
nothing in the Royer decision stated that the Terry exception is con-
fined to the investigation of ongoing crimes.' 0 3 Justice White in
Royer explicitly stated that "if there is articulable suspicion that a
person has committed or is about to commit a crime" then the Terry
exception is applicable.1 04
97 Id. at 146. The Adams Court did not specify whether the information had to come
from a civilian or whether officers could rely on information supplied by other officers.
98 See Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 680. The Hensley Court cited Adams as standing for the
proposition that the Teny exception applied to investigation of suspects whom an officer
believed "was committing a crime at the moment of the stop." Id.
99 Id. (citing Hensley, 713 F.2d at 224).
100 460 U.S. 491 (1983). See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
101 Royer, 460 U.S. at 507. In Royer, two narcotics agents at Miami International Air-
port observed Royer and determined that he fit a "drug courier profile." The agents,
suspicious that Royer was carrying narcotics, approached Royer and asked him to pro-
duce his driver's license and airline ticket. Noting discrepancies in the documents, the
agents identified themselves, related to Royer their suspcion, and asked him to accom-
pany them to a small room. There, the officers, having retrieved Royer's luggage, asked
Royer if they could search the bags. Without giving his oral consent, Royer produced
the luggage key. The search revealed marijuana and Royer was placed under arrest.
The trial court convicted him of the felony of possession of marijuana but the appellate
court reversed, holding that Royer had been involuntarily detained without probable
cause. Id. at 493-495.
102 Brief for Petitioner at 14 n.9, United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
103 Royer, 460 U.S. at 498.
104 449 U.S. 411 (1981). In Cortez, border patrol agents were judged to have reason-
able cause to stop and investigate a person suspected of transporting illegal aliens after
the agents had made a detailed study of the suspect's movements. Id. at 421-22.
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Similarly, in United States v. Cortez,10 5 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that "an officer may stop and question a person if there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a person is wanted for past crimi-
nal conduct."10 6 Further, in United States v. Place,10 7 the Supreme
Court declared that "when the officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicion that the person has been, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity," he may effect an investigation of that individ-
ual. 10 8 These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hensley is consistent with precedent.
Moreover, the Court's extension of the Terry exception pro-
motes the governmental interests of solving crimes and appre-
hending offenders. The Hensley Court balanced these interests
against an individual's fourth amendment rights, and correctly con-
cluded that the governmental interests were compelling enough to
warrant the extenson of the Teny exception to include investigatory
stops of individuals reasonably suspected of having committed com-
pleted crimes.109 The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he law enforce-
ment interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the
individual's interests to be free of a stop and detention that is no
more extensive than permissible in the investigation of ongoing
crimes."110
B. THE HENSLEY DECISION FOSTERS INTERDEPARTMENTAL RELIANCE
The second issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Hensley
was the justification underlying the stop of an individual by officers
of one police department in reliance on a flyer issued by another
department stating that the individual was wanted for investigation
of a felony. I "' The Supreme Court in Hensley correctly reversed the
Sixth Circuit's decision that the flyer issued by the St. Bernard Po-
105 Id. at 417 n.2.
106 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In Place, two Drug Enforcement Administration agents at
Miami International Airport suspected Place of transporting narcotics and alerted DEA
agents in New York. Place was detained by agents upon arrival at LaGuardia in New
York for nearly two hours while the agents attempted to learn whether his luggage con-
tained narcotics. Id. at 698-700. The Supreme Court held that the length of the deten-
tion and the prolonged seizure of Place's luggage exceeded the limited scope of
investigative stops permitted under the Terry exception. Id. at 709. Therefore, the nar-
cotics found in Place's luggage were inadmissible into evidence at trial. Id. at 710.
107 Id. at 702.
108 See Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 681.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 684. The Sixth Circuit stated that "t]he St. Bernard flyer contained no in-
formation regarding Hensley's purported role in the robbery, and thus contained no
'specific and articulable facts' that would have justified the stop." Hensley, 713 F.2d at
225. See supra note 43.
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lice Department failed to provide sufficient facts that would arouse a
reasonable suspicion in the Covington officers, thereby rendering
the Covington officers' stop and investigation of Hensley illegal.'
1 2
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in Hensley that the St.
Bernard flyer lacked sufficient facts to justify an investigative stop is
inconsistent with other appellate cases which held that an officer
may make an investigative stop in reliance on a police bulletin,
although he has no personal knowledge of facts warranting the
investigation." 1
3
In United States v. Maryland,1 4 a police department broadcasted
a radio message to neighboring law enforcement agencies stating
that several individuals were suspected of passing counterfeit
bills. 1 5 The message described the suspects and their automobile,
and requested that law enforcement officers aid in the arrest of the
suspects.1 6 After hearing the broadcast, a policeman from another
department spotted the suspects' automobile, stopped it, and took
the suspects in his patrol car to the local courthouse." t7 Once the
officer escorted the suspects to the courthouse, the officer returned
to their car, searched it, and found counterfeit bills hidden near
where one of the suspects sat.""
The suspects argued that the officer's search was not incident to
a lawful arrest because probable cause did not exist to justify the
arrest.1 19 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, held
that the radio message contained information sufficient to supply
probable cause for the suspect's arrest. 120 In addition, the court
held that the arresting officer was "entitled to rely on the radio bul-
letin issued by the neighboring department."'
121
112 Brief for Petitioner at 18, United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
113 479 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1973).





119 Id. at 569. The Court's decision noted that the interdepartmental arrest occurred
"only a short time after" the crime was committed. Id. It is unclear, however, whether
the Court gave weight to the time differential or whether this fact was merely collateral
to the officer's citing of the automobile described in the message.
120 Id.
121 482 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1973). The Secret Service reported to police in Witchita
Falls, Texas that Impson, suspected of possessing counterfeit currency, would soon be
in the area. The report described Impson's automobile and the package containing the
currency. A Witchita Falls officer cited Impson's car, stopped it and searched the vehi-
cle, spotting in plain view the package containing the counterfeit bills. The bills were
introduced into evidence at trial against Impson. Id. at 198.
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Similarly, in United States v. Impson, 122 the Fifth Circuit held that
"[w]e do not question in the least the correctness of the principle
that the searching-arresting officer can act on the basis of informa-
tion of which he has no personal knowledge which has been relayed
to him by police transmission facilities."' 23 These cases indicate
that interdepartmental reliance is not a novel concept in law en-
forcement procedure. The Supreme Court's favorable view towards
interdepartmental reliance does not, therefore, represent a radical
departure from conventional police practice, as illustrated by Mary-
land and Impson.
In Hensley, the Supreme Court discussed two cases, Whiteley v.
Warden124 and United States v. Robinson,' 25 to support its approval of
interdepartmental reliance, where the issuing police department's
report is based on a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific ar-
ticulable facts.126 The Robinson decision focused directly on the con-
nection between the reasonable suspicion standard and law
enforcement's reliance on interdepartmental communications. In
Robinson, a police officer's actions were in reliance on a police radio
dispatcher's message asking that he be alerted to the interstate
transportation of a possible stolen car. 127 The only information re-
lated by the dispatcher was a license plate number. The officer knew
no facts about the alleged crime, nor was he aware of the basis for
the dispatcher's report. 128 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the arresting officer's search of the supposedly stolen
vehicle was illegal and the evidence discovered during the search
was inadmissible at trial.' 29 The Ninth Circuit's opinion stated,
however, that "[i]f the dispatcher himself had founded suspicion, or
if he had relied on information from a reliable informant who sup-
plied him with adequate facts to establish founded suspicion, the
dispatcher could properly have delegated the stopping function" to
122 Id. at 199. The Court cautioned, however, that if the report is the sole cause for
the detention and the resulting search... then the government has the burden of show-
ing that the information on which the action was based itself had a reasonable founda-
tion." Id.
123 401 U.S. 560 (1971). See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. Whiteley is
pertinent to the Hensley Court's analysis because it focuses on interdepartmental reli-
ance. Yet, it is distinguishable from Hensley in that it involves a probable cause standard
rather than the reasonable suspicion standard of the Teny exception.
124 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
125 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 682-83.
126 Robinson, 536 F.2d at 1299.
127 Id.




the officer making the stop.130 The Ninth Circuit's opinion explic-
itly conveys its approval of interdepartmental reliance that is
grounded in a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts by the
issuing department. The Hensley Court cited with approval the
Robinson Court's theory on interdepartmental reliance.'3 1
Applying the Robinson opinion of interdepartmental reliance to
the facts of Hensley, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the
details contained in the informant's statement to Officer Davis of the
St. Bernard Police Department provided Davis with facts sufficient
to evoke a reasonable suspicion that Hensley had been involved in
the armed robbery. 132 The Court held, therefore, that the Coving-
ton officers' investigatory stop and search of Hensley was not unlaw-
ful and that their attempt to detain him long enough to ascertain
whether there was a warrant outstanding for his arrest was a rational
procedure characteristic of experienced law enforcement officials.' 33
Furthermore, the Hensley Court concluded that since the stop was
lawful, any evidence obtained during the officers' search of Hens-
ley's car was admissible at trial. 134
The interdepartmental reliance standard employed by the
Supreme Court in Hens/ey is commendable because it serves the gov-
ernmental interest of effective law enforcement while protecting the
fourth amendment rights of those individuals detained by law en-
forcement officials. On the one hand, interdepartmental coopera-
tion increases the likelihood that crimes will be solved and offenders
brought to justice. The Hensley Court exhibited insight regarding
these governmental objectives when it observed that, in an age
when criminals have ready access to transportation and are likely to
flee the investigating department's jurisdictional boundary, interde-
partmental cooperation is a necessity.' 3 5 Yet, the standard's re-
quirement that the report relied upon be the product of the issuing
department's reasonable suspicion serves to protect the fourth
amendment rights of those individuals detained by police. The
Robinson court explicitly stated that the absence of a reasonable sus-
picion based on articulable facts invalidates a search, thereby ren-
dering any incriminating evidence discovered during the search
inadmissible.' 3 6 This requirement undoubtedly will have a deter-
130 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 683.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 684.
134 Id. at 682.
135 See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
136 Hensley, 105 S. Ct. at 682.
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rent effect on law enforcement officials, discouraging random stops
of individuals that the officers encounter.
The Hensley Court's holding that police in one department may
rely on a report issued by another department-provided that the
flyer is grounded in a reasonable suspicion based on articulable
facts that the individual wanted was involved in a completed fel-
onyl 37-strikes a tempered balance between two compelling societal
concerns. Most importantly, the Hensley decision manages to pro-
mote both of these concerns without sacrificing either to the other.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's analysis of Hensley sets a new and valuable
standard in the area of law enforcement. The Court's ruling that an
investigation of individuals suspected of committing completed
felonies does come within the purview of the Teny exception serves
to aid law enforcement officials in apprehending wanted felons.
Although the Court recognized the fourth amendment's general
probable cause requirement, the Court also recognized the compet-
ing governmental interests of bringing offenders to justice and solv-
ing crimes. Both constitutional guarantees and effective police
practices are important societal concerns and must be protected.
The Hensley decision also strengthens law enforcement practices
by permitting one department to rely on information issued by an-
other department, provided the latter's correspondence reflects a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the person
wanted was involved in a completed crime. This standard of inter-
departmental reliance promotes the governmental objectives of
solving crimes and apprehending offenders, while safeguarding the
fourth amendment rights of individuals detained by law enforce-
ment officials.
JOLENE D. PETrUS
137 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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